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Abstract: Practitioners, researchers and policy-makers involved with cyber secu-
rity often talk about “security hygiene:” ways to encourage users of computer tech-
nology to use safe and secure behavior online. But how do we persuade workers 
to follow simple, fundamental processes to protect themselves and others? These 
issues are raised by behavioral scientists, to encourage worker, passenger and 
patient compliance. In this paper, we explore and summarize findings in social 
psychology about moral values and habit formation, and then integrate them into 
suggestions for transforming staff security behavior online.
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1  Introduction
Practitioners, researchers and policy-makers involved with cyber security often 
talk about “security hygiene:” ways to encourage users of computer technology 
to use safe and secure behavior online. There is significant evidence that current 
security awareness activities are not effective. For example, a recent Information 
Security Forum (2014) survey noted that “around 85% of Member organizations 
reported that their people were either unaware, or were aware but not taking all the 
correct actions to minimize [security] risk.” Moreover, “75% of ISF Members have 
an ongoing awareness program, yet only 15% reported that they had reached that 
heightened level of awareness and positive behaviors that they are striving for.”
These concerns are shared by others in related areas, such as crime science 
and organizational security: How do we persuade workers to follow simple, fun-
damental processes to protect themselves and others? These issues are raised in 
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other contexts, especially by behavioral scientists, to encourage worker, passen-
ger and patient compliance. In this paper, we have reviewed what economists, 
sociologists and psychologists have discovered about effective behavior change, 
to identify factors leading to success. Each of the identified factors is under-
pinned by empirical evidence reported in solid, peer-reviewed studies. From 
these results, we have drawn together insights – well-known and well-accepted 
in their own disciplines – and derived from them a framework for understanding 
how organizations can successfully change security behavior in the long term. 
This new approach to understanding and improving security behavior is thought-
provoking and leverages empirically-demonstrated long-term success in similar 
situations. To that end, we explore studies in these similar areas, summarize rel-
evant findings, and integrate them into suggestions for building on existing work 
and transforming staff security behavior online.
2  Building on Homo Economicus and Swiss Cheese
Organizational leaders do or should care about security: The Ponemon Institute’s Cost 
of Data Breach Study indicates that 35% of breaches are caused by human factors. 
(http://www.ponemon.org/library/2013-cost-of-data-breach-global- analysis¯) 
To encourage secure behavior when using applications and communications 
 technology, most invest in training to ensure their staff knows both security policies 
and how to use security tools. For staff, however, functionality usually trumps secu-
rity: users circumvent security in order to focus on meeting deadlines, making tasks 
easier, and speeding interaction with colleagues.
To address this problem, some researchers have looked beyond technology for 
assistance. Initially, cyber security’s technological genesis and effectiveness were 
viewed through an economic lens; accelerated by over a dozen Workshops on the 
Economics of Information Security (http://weis2014.econinfosec.org/past.php), 
concepts from traditional and behavioral economics have been applied to cyber 
security to help us understand the motivations for security- and privacy-based 
actions that seem otherwise to be counter-intuitive or even counter-productive. For 
example, Acquisti and Grossklags (2003) sought to understand how market behav-
ior might influence security attitudes and behaviors. Herley (2009) noted that 
most users ignore security advice, because there is no economic incentive to do so. 
“Users’ rejection of the security advice they receive is entirely rational from an eco-
nomic perspective. The advice offers to shield them from the direct costs of attacks, 
but burdens them with far greater indirect costs in the form of effort.”
Pfleeger and Caputo (2012) identified several areas of behavioral science 
beyond economics that could be useful not only in addressing our understanding 
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of user behavior but also in informing our design so that systems encourage good 
security behavior. Herzberg (1987) emphasizes that it is not enough to ask users to 
be careful: “What is the simplest, surest, and most direct way of getting someone 
to do something? Ask? But if the person responds that he or she does not want to 
do it, then that calls for psychological consultation to determine the reason for 
such obstinacy.”
We know that once-a-year security reminders have limited effectiveness, but 
“improved” training seems to make little difference in employees’ attitudes and 
reactions. Technologists tend to want to prescribe and proscribe: devise approved 
processes to keep organizations safe and secure. Indeed, employees who do not 
comply with policies are blamed as being the “weakest link” in the security 
chain. However, the safety literature suggests that such constraints and admoni-
tions alone do not work.
Reason (2008), who has long studied safety and security habits and behav-
iors, found that if an organization views the “human as hazard” and prescribes 
only one way to do things, adherence and compliance often backfire. Reason points 
out that some accidents are inevitable. Layers of defense are like layers of Swiss 
cheese which, if aligned in the right way, will allow the enablers of bad outcomes 
to make their way through the holes. He notes in a variety of examples that “heroic 
actions” have prevented accidents from leading to even worse consequences. Yet 
heroic behavior does not just happen; organizations must invest in an environment 
that enables the heroic acts to occur. To create such an environment, Reason says 
the solution lies in emphasizing individual and collective “mindfulness”: aware-
ness of what might go wrong, and understanding of actions that could mitigate 
those effects. Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) explain that mindfulness is an attitude into 
which is woven preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify interpretations, 
sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience and deference to expertise.
In essence, this approach uses a psychological rather than a technical solu-
tion to the problem. It advocates understanding the issue and problems from a 
user’s perspective and then determining how messages about behavioral change 
can be most effective.
Thus, the essential question for technologists is: how do we encourage such 
mindfulness, so that employees become “security heroes” and advocates and 
who can recognize enabling vulnerabilities and take actions to plug them? The 
answers appear to lie in applying behavioral science: the broader set of factors 
that affect security behavior in practice. Security improvements may result from 
applying basic human factors knowledge (see sidebar) when we design, develop, 
use and maintain systems with a security component. But we currently lack 
similar guidance on using appropriate training, cues, rewards and motivation to 
create and nourish a healthy security culture.
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Herzberg’s work provides one of the keys to establishing this culture: under-
standing the difference between motivation and hygiene. He notes that “environ-
mental factors (hygiene) can at best create no dissatisfaction on the job, and their 
absence creates dissatisfaction. In contrast, what makes people happy on the job 
and motivates them are the job content factors (motivators).” Thus, the key to 
enabling good security behavior may be providing good motivators. In turn, to 
motivate people appropriately, we must understand what they value and why.
Sidebar: Human Factors and Security
Human Factors techniques can maximize human performance while ensur-
ing safety and security. Their key principle is designing technology that fits 
a person’s physical and mental abilities: fitting the task to the human. Rarely 
should we fit the human to the task, because it requires significant organiza-
tional investment in training which, even when effective, still diverts time and 
effort away from critical activities. For example, an organization could train 
its employees to become memory artists, enabling them to juggle a large and 
changing number of PINs and passwords. Employees would then need most 
of their time for routines and exercises that reinforce memory and recall. That 
is, in addition to the time spent on the training course, employees still would 
have to spend time every day on memorizing and recalling passwords. It is more 
efficient to instead change security policies and implement mechanisms that 
enabling employees to cope without training. This approach is clear to behavio-
ral experts but not always to those technologists and policy-makers who make 
and dictate security policies. But there is reported evidence of success in some 
areas. For example, the introduction of a low-effort, two-factor authentication 
solution (e.g. installing a token on the user’s device, combined with a simple, 
memorable password) can improve security and reduce user workload. As a 
result, many organizations have now changed their password expiry policies, 
allowing users to keep passwords for longer periods of time, since there is evi-
dence that compromised passwords tend to be exploited immediately and once. 
(http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/11/changing_passwo.html)
One key to understanding this approach is the ability to distinguish between 
production (primary) and enabling (secondary) tasks. Secondary tasks, such as 
safety and security-related behaviors, are not necessary for completing the pro-
duction task. Rather, they are an investment to protect both individual and organ-
ization from harm: the enabling environment encouraged by Reason. Because 
human behavior is generally goal-driven, people use technology to get their jobs 
done. So a security task’s time and workload should be as low as possible.
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Humans are tempted to bypass secondary tasks, especially with primary 
task-related time or performance pressures. There are many examples of 
incentives that backfire, encouraging worse security behavior instead 
of better. For example, Sasse et  al. (2001) describe an employee repri-
manded by her line manager for not completing a production task on time; 
she  forgot  her  password and could not access the necessary files. That 
employee will most likely write her passwords down to avoid being repri-
manded again!
Security tasks often interrupt production tasks at critical points; resump-
tion can require backtracking or repetition. This “restart cost” can be sig-
nificant. Even seemingly less-disruptive security tasks such as warnings are 
rarely effective, because people see them as obstacles rather than protec-
tion. Wogalter and Feng (2010), using a human-in-the-loop model, show how 
applying human factors knowledge can minimize disruptions and maximize 
compliance.
One obvious way to ensure effective security behavior is to encourage habits that 
are skill-based rather than knowledge-based; the latter are slow and effortful, 
increasing workload. Psychologists Reason (2008), Haidt (2012), and Kahne-
man (2011) arrived at the same conclusion from slightly different perspectives: 
good habits must be integrated into business processes.
Thus, the best way to achieve compliance with security policies is to integrate 
security tasks with production tasks. Usability principles, such as exploiting 
the modality of interaction, can be applied. For instance, a production task 
involving typing might recognize the user from keystrokes, location and device, 
verifying user identity without disruption.
The physical and social context in which humans perform their tasks can also 
interfere with their security compliance. For instance, entering a regularly-used 
long passphrase on a keyboard may be low-effort, but entering it on a small 
device with a soft keyboard when standing on a crowded platform on a win-
ter’s day will take significantly longer. Social context matters, too: employees in 
shared offices may not want to divulge knowledge-based credentials when they 
can be overheard. Similarly, deploying screen-locks when leaving a computer 
may signal a lack of trust to colleagues.
In these ways, organizations that want to improve their security should 
apply human factors knowledge first. This self-evident first step is too often 
ignored.
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3  From One to Many
Can an individual’s demography, personality and values explain security choices? 
The answer to this question can suggest which approaches are likely to be most 
effective in encouraging good security behavior. Just as some people tend to be 
more “accident prone,” some individuals may simply be more security conscious 
and compliant than others. It is important to know whether unsafe or insecure 
actions online are related to generally unhealthy traits.
For example, some researchers are investigating whether characteristics like 
paranoia, obsessive-compulsiveness, anti-social behavior or impulsiveness might 
predict unwelcome actions online. For instance, one recent study by McBride 
et al. (2012) correlated certain kinds of personality traits with likely cybersecurity 
behavior. They found that an “open” individual is less likely to obey a security 
protocol, but that an “open” person with a low sense of self-efficacy is more likely 
to obey it. Empirical work in this area is in its infancy but could yield some impor-
tant information about how to target different groups in different settings with 
relevant information that will encourage good practice.
There are also important sociological implications for security science. 
Durkheim (1897) wrote that, “Man cannot become attached to higher aims and 
submit to a rule if he sees nothing above him to which he belongs.” Haidt (2012) 
emphasizes that:
“Utilitarians since Jeremy Bentham have focused intently on individuals. They try to improve 
the welfare of society by giving individuals what they want. But a Durkheimian version of 
utilitarianism would recognize that human flourishing requires social order and embedded-
ness. … social order is extraordinarily difficult to achieve. … binding  foundations – Loyalty, 
Authority and Sanctity – have a crucial role to play in a good society.”
In other words, security issues are embedded in, and deeply influenced by, social 
context such as corporate and national culture. In this sense, these issues have to 
be understood and addressed before any successful intervention program can be 
successfully introduced.
4  The Effort of Security
Recognizing the security burden is important. Muraven et al. (2008) demonstrated 
that tasks related to compliance require us to tap a limited amount of “vitality” 
needed for self-control; using a lot of self-control in one activity leaves little for 
later, more important activities. Kahneman (2011) illustrates (in Figure  1) the 
steps we might take to provide “cognitive ease” and reduce the “cognitive load.”
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It is not by chance that the concept of ease is used a great deal in advertising. 
Indeed, branding a service or product as “easy” conveys an important message to 
consumers: Easy-Off oven cleaner, EasyJet Airlines, Easy-PC, and Easy-Flo Central 
Vacuum Cleaners are just a few examples where branding stresses minimal dif-
ficulty or discomfort. Behavioral economists explore how we can design human 
systems that make life easier for the user and that therefore should ensure greater 
compliance. Some of their ideas, such as priming people with security words and 
images, are already being used, and the ideas’ effectiveness is being tested.
For example, Beautement et al. (2008) describe the energy required to comply 
with security procedures. Employees, not necessarily lazy or selfish, are prepared 
to expend a reasonable amount of effort, called a compliance budget, to keep the 
organization safe. Human factors knowledge (both common sense and personal 
experience) tells us that users are tempted to shortcut secondary tasks requiring 
high workload. The compliance budget is a user’s way of keeping a mental tally 
of that effort. The effects on the compliance budget are cumulative, so that even a 
succession of reasonable-effort security tasks leads to short-cutting.
The lesson here is that, to encourage employee compliance with security pol-
icies, organizations should ensure that the daily security workload is manageable 
on individual tasks and overall. Both the number of security tasks and each task’s 
effort should not drain the energy reservoir unnecessarily.
So how, as technologists, policy-makers and researchers, can we continue to 
address this goal? The remainder of our article provides a framework and guide-
lines based on solid empirical, behavioral-science-related findings.
We begin by examining the meaning of organizational culture and its role in 
creating an environment for positive security habits. We then show how Haidt’s 
Repeated experience
Clear communication
Primed idea
Good mood
Feels familiar
Feels true
Feels good
Feels effortless
EASE
Figure 1 Causes and Consequences of Cognitive Ease (adapted from Kahneman 2011).
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(2012) moral foundations theory can be applied to help us understand both 
individual and group security actions. Next, we develop a taxonomy of security-
related values that can be used to tailor security training, messages and even 
system design to encourage “good security hygiene.” But good hygiene (neces-
sary but not sufficient for a security culture) involves developing good security 
habits (for individuals) and good security routines (for organizations). We review 
the empirical behavioral science literature about habit formation and modifica-
tion and apply it to security issues. With these foundations, we build a multi-
dimensional framework for understanding how individuals and groups perceive 
security that can drive new ways to build and use systems. Finally, we pose a host 
of open research questions whose answers can enable organizations to create and 
nourish a security culture.
5  Enhancing Security Culture
Managers often talk about creating or improving their security culture, and they 
even discuss culture as a “security tool.” (See, for example, http://issuu.com/ 
pippinkellic/docs/human_behavior_overview_u.s.) But what does that mean, 
and how do we use culture to improve security behavior?
Generally, “culture” refers to a group’s set of shared beliefs and values, 
reflected in the organizational practices. Schein (2004) explains that there are 
three levels of an organization’s culture: artifacts and behaviors, espoused 
values, and underlying assumptions. Each level is evident to an outside observer. 
For example, artifacts are tangible, overt and identifiable, and they can include 
office furniture, dress codes, and even office jokes. Espoused values include not 
only stated values but also public enforcement (such as punishment for discrimi-
natory acts). Underlying assumptions are shared actions and attitudes that are 
woven into everyday office activities.
There are many different conceptions of corporate and national culture, 
some offering a dimensional and others a categorical approach. For example, 
Schein (1996) explains how an organization’s culture relates to eight “anchors” of 
an individual’s career: autonomy and independence, security and stability, tech-
nical-functional competence, general managerial competence, entrepreneurial 
creativity, service or dedication to a cause, pure challenge, and life style. Even 
when defined quite simply as “the way we do things around here,” culture is rec-
ognized as a powerful force in ensuring compliance Thus, many culture change 
interventions first set out to establish and define the organizational or depart-
mental culture and then to implement a series of very specific processes to bring 
about change.
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Organizational change is a long-term and costly business, only sometimes 
characterized by success (Furnham 2005). So additional insight is needed for 
improving the likelihood of positive change. The cultural dimensions by them-
selves do not suggest strategies for understanding and improving security culture. 
However, their underlying morals and values may hold the key to improved secu-
rity (and other) practices, because values can impel individuals to adopt good 
security habits.
6  Moral Foundations and Security Values
Values are the beliefs in which people have an emotional investment. As basic 
convictions on how to conduct yourself in society, they guide you in living your 
life in a personally or socially preferable way. That is, values tell you how to live 
life “properly,” according to your value system. Values are important because 
they
 – Provide understanding of attitudes, motivation and behaviors
 – Influence our perception of the world around us
 – Represent interpretations of “right” and “wrong”
 – Imply that some behaviors or outcomes are preferred over others
Morals involve the values that distinguish right from wrong, so they govern 
behaviors, priorities and choices. “Moral systems are interlocking sets of values, 
virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psy-
chological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate self-interest 
and make cooperative societies possible.” (Haidt 2012). Haidt’s extensive empiri-
cal validation of moral systems’ influence political actions means that moral 
systems can influence security-related choices, too.
Many people assume that morality can be explained using only one criterion: 
primum no nocere (first, do no harm). Indeed, people who think that their actions 
are harming neither organizational nor employee security feel as though they are 
acting correctly. But that is not always the case: What is fine for one person may 
be considered harm by another whose moral system is different.
To see why, consider how moral systems differ. Haidt’s empirical research 
suggests that, no matter how morals are developed, they are multi-faceted, guide 
an individual’s choices and behaviors, and can be expressed in terms of the six 
dimensions shown in Table 1. For example, the care-harm dimension does not 
explain why some people are disgusted by website defacement, while others 
are ambivalent. But the sanctity-degradation dimension explains it; it reflects 
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the way some people invest an item with meaning beyond its usual value. The 
website is a symbol of the organization whose information it conveys, so disre-
spect for the website equates to disrespect for the organization. Taken together, 
these dimensions and their associated emotions and virtues can explain how an 
individual perceives an item or action, and how he or she reacts to it.
This validated framework (as described in Haidt 2012) tells us that if we know 
the moral profiles for individuals and groups, we can see where they stand on these 
various dimensions, and how that standing relates to a positive security culture.
Moreover, the moral foundations often lead to strong reactions to situations – 
strength that can be leveraged to find ways to influence security-related behav-
iors. We have examined each of the six dimensions, to see what each implies for 
security.
Listed again in Table 2, each moral dimension is associated with security 
challenges, triggers and actions. For example, as we have seen, the sanctity-deg-
radation foundation suggests that organizational symbols such as websites, flags 
and logos may be invested with meaning. To encourage a security culture, the 
organization can react by putting in place protections for its website, as well as a 
reporting scheme for notifying the organization if defacement takes place.
By assessing these dimensions, triggers and actions, an organization inter-
ested in improving security culture can see where security help is needed, 
and then put in place awareness mechanisms (e.g. warnings, informational 
Table 1 Six Dimensions of Moral Foundations.
Dimension 
of Moral 
Foundation
  Meaning   Characteristic 
Emotions
  Related Virtues
Care vs. 
Harm
  Being sensitive to signs of suffering 
and need; dislike of cruelty
  Compassion   Caring, kindness
Fairness vs. 
Cheating
  Reaping the rewards of collaboration 
without being exploited
  Anger, gratitude, 
guilt
  Fairness, justice, 
trustworthiness
Liberty vs. 
Oppression
  Being sensitive to controlling 
behavior
  Freedom, restraint, 
resistance, reactance
  Openness
Loyalty vs. 
Betrayal
  Forming and maintaining coalitions   Group pride, rage at 
traitors, trust
  Loyalty, patriotism, 
self-sacrifice
Authority vs. 
Subversion
  Forging relationships that will 
benefit us within social hierarchies
  Respect, fear   Obedience, 
deference
Sanctity vs. 
Degradation
  Being sensitive to an array of symbolic 
objects and threats; investing objects 
with value (positive and negative) 
beyond their usual meaning
  Disgust, reverence   Temperance, 
chastity, piety, 
cleanliness
Adapted from Haidt 2012.
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Table 2 Moral Foundations’ Implications for Security Challenges, Triggers and Actions.
Dimension 
of Moral 
Foundation
  Security Challenges   Security Triggers   Security Actions
Care vs. 
Harm
  Protect and care 
for organizational 
assets
  Assets labeled clearly 
with their value to the 
organization and the 
individual
  –  Awareness about assets 
and their value
–  Provide effective training 
and education about good 
security practices
Fairness vs. 
Cheating
  Reap benefits of 
organizational 
membership
  Practices that can affect 
other people’s security 
and well-being
  –  Awareness of possible 
harm to other people
–  Awareness of harm to 
organization
Liberty vs. 
Oppression
  Freedom to 
act but within 
organizational 
policies and 
constraints
  Reminders about 
security policies and 
procedures
  –  Effective communication 
and enforcement of security 
policies and procedures
–  Integration of policies and 
procedures into business 
practices
Loyalty vs. 
Betrayal
  Form cohesive 
coalitions around 
effective leaders to 
further personal and 
organizational goals
  Information about 
security practices 
of others in same or 
similar groups
  –  Information about similar 
practices (e.g. “87% of 
employees did not click on 
this link”)
Authority vs. 
Subversion
  Forge beneficial 
relationships within 
hierarchies
  Reminders about access 
controls and policies
  –  Integration of access 
warnings and messages
Sanctity vs. 
Degradation
  Avoid degradation 
of organizational 
symbols and 
policies
  Symbols representing 
the organizational 
brand, such as web 
sites, flags, logos; 
policies specifying that, 
when not enforced, 
have significant 
consequences
  –  Protection of symbols from 
defacement
–  Reporting procedures 
for detection of symbol 
defacement
–  Serious consequences for 
contravening policy
websites, reminders) and training schemes that appeal to each employee’s 
moral values. These mechanisms and schemes can reflect an organization’s 
culture as well as an individual’s preferences. By approaching mechanisms, 
awareness and training in this way, an organization can take advantage of 
each employee’s predispositions to perceive and react; the resulting outcomes 
should feel more natural to the employee and be consonant with the employ-
ee’s other behaviors.
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7  Changing Security Habits
The long-term goal is to improve each employee’s security habits, making his or her 
security actions natural – thereby not depleting each person’s compliance budget. 
Although we like to think that our choices are made based on reasoning rooted 
in our values, Haidt (2012) summarizes research that clearly shows that intuitions 
come first, then strategic reasoning second. Thus, a key to changing security habits 
may be changing intuitions based on individual and group moral values, so that 
people instinctively believe that the new ways will work better than the old ways.
How do we change these intuitions? By changing our habits. Much of our 
day involves habits rather than conscious decisions. We awaken, make breakfast, 
and travel to work by relying on a set of learned behaviors, each of which is trig-
gered by a cue of which we may not even be aware. Andrews (1908) describes a 
habit as a “fixed way of thinking, willing or feeling acquired through previous 
repetition of a mental experience.” Duhigg (2012) refines the notion by calling it 
a certain behavior that occurs in response to a certain cue that in turn leads to a 
certain reward. Our workplace behaviors (e.g. submitting time sheets, taking a 
lunch break, attending staff meetings) often become habits, sometimes prompted 
by a set of routines encouraged by our organizations.
Much recent psychological research has attempted to understand when and 
why we experience quick, lazy, intuitive, heuristic and habitual thinking that 
is prone to error. To explain the causes, Stanovich and West (2000) distinguish 
between System 1 (what Reason called skill-based) and System 2 (what Reason 
calls knowledge-based). System 1 “has learned associations between ideas … 
and learned skills such as reading and understanding nuances of social situa-
tions.” By contrast, “the highly diverse operations of System 2 have one feature in 
common: they require attention and are disrupted when attention is drawn away. 
… Among the basic features of System 1 is its ability to set expectations and to be 
surprised when these expectations are violated. … System 2 can reset the expec-
tations of System 1 on the fly.” (Kahneman 2011). Haidt (2008) calls System 1 our 
emotional self and System 2 our rational self, using the metaphor of a small rider 
(System 2) astride a large elephant (System 1) to convey the difficulty our rational 
minds face when trying to control our instincts and emotions.
Habits help to address this difference, using automatic action to accustom 
System 1 to follow System 2’s instructions. Heath and Heath (2010) explain that 
habits make us efficient: “the elephant gets things done.” But automatic behavior 
also means that individuals tend to choose short-term gratification over longer-
term achievements: they want to get the reward as quickly as possible. “Changes 
often fail because the rider simply cannot keep the elephant on the road long 
enough to reach the destination.” (Heath and Heath 2010).
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In the security context, organizations may choose to invest in security to 
assure their long-term survival, but individuals will be inclined to instead focus 
on the rewards of completing their primary task (and perhaps take security short-
cuts to preserve their compliance budget).
Once established, behavioral and cognitive habits are very hard to change. 
Maio and his colleagues (2007) point out that many behaviors change very slowly, 
if at all. Moreover, it is not enough to change attitude; attitudinal change does 
not always end with behavioral change. For example, Hobson (2003) found that 
changed attitude toward climate change did not alter habits affecting climate 
change. Kempton et al. (1992) demonstrated that one-time change in behavior is 
relatively easy, compared with long-term, repetitive behavioral change.
Paradoxically, security systems have conditioned many individuals to 
respond to security cues by ignoring or bypassing them whenever possible. That 
is, the security systems have encouraged bad, rather than good, security habits. 
As an example, consider security warnings: most individuals have been condi-
tioned to understand that there are few or no consequences to ignoring warnings 
about possible insecure files, certificates or sites; as a result, they have developed 
a habit of deleting or ignoring the system’s warnings boxes. In a recent empiri-
cal study, Krol et al. (2012) found that 81.7% of their study participants ignored 
warnings before downloading a file onto their own computer. In the debrief 
interview, most participants said that they had ignored warnings before, “and 
since nothing bad happened,” went ahead with their intended action anyway. 
In other words, participants assumed that no harm was done: nothing bad had 
happened, and the users were seemingly unaware that if they had downloaded a 
piece of malware, the consequences might not have been immediately obvious. 
This result was confirmed in the McBride et al. study; low likelihood of punish-
ment led to higher likelihoods of undesirable security behaviors. Thus, a security 
warning without consequences has become a cue that triggers a habit of dismiss-
ing it and getting on with the primary task: the reward. Moreover, every time this 
happens, the habit is reinforced.
Even when there are consequences, it matters whether the bad behavior 
affects the individual or someone else. For example, Grant and Hofmann (2011) 
found that health care professionals are more likely to wash their hands when 
reminded of the consequences for others than when reminded of the conse-
quences for themselves.
So how can we break this habit cycle? Security awareness and training activi-
ties are often cited as ways of breaking the cycle and establishing better habits. 
Egelman et al. (2008) reported that active rather than passive warnings, incorpo-
rating explanations of threats and consequences, stopped four of five participants 
from succumbing to a spear phishing attack. But in the organizational context, 
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Caputo and her colleagues (2014) found that warnings making employees aware 
of spear phishing attempts and educating them about prevention strategies had 
no effect because the employees were not reading the warnings. Indeed, some of 
the study subjects ignored the warnings, thinking they were themselves evidence 
of malware! So awareness and training must be approached differently if organi-
zations are to develop an effective security culture.
Organizations can use knowledge about habit formation to improve their 
employees’ security behavior. Duhigg (2012) suggests that an individual’s behav-
ior can be changed by inserting a new routine between cue and reward. In secu-
rity, this strategy means replacing the insecure behavior with a secure one: the 
goal of security awareness and training. Yet this strategy fails if the reward is not 
consistent with the action. The goal is primary task completion, but the inconsist-
ent security action can actually postpone goal attainment – and with little or no 
discernible benefit. In such situations, we need solutions more aligned with the 
goal. Ideally, we should make the secondary security task disappear, and instead 
assist individuals in completing their primary task.
Several attempts have been made to eliminate security tasks. For instance, 
consider the threat of illegitimate product sites online. For many popular prod-
ucts, as many as seven out of the top ten listed search results offer fake products 
or are phishing for personal details (Edelman and Rosenbaum 2006). In response 
to this problem, First Cyber Security has developed a modified search engine, 
called Safe Shop Window, (http://www.safeshopwindow.co.uk/?att = fcs), that 
shows only legitimate retail sites when customers search for a product. This solu-
tion removes the traditional security steps: producing a warning for suspected 
illegitimate sites and possibly restricting the searcher’s behavior in some way.
Many other security problems could more effectively and efficiently be solved 
by integrating security with primary tasks, thereby removing the disincentive of 
increased workload: what Beautement et al. (2008) called friction. Such strategies 
would also change the user’s general perception of security as an effort drain, 
making security align with one or more of the six moral dimensions.
To achieve this alignment, system designers (who, as Herley (2009) notes, 
“value users’ time at zero”) could switch their focus from changing users’ security 
habits to designing security that at least fits into primary tasks or at most requires 
a minimal amount of extra effort. In other words, we should examine ways to 
improve designers’ habits as well as users’ security habits; the former can enable 
the latter.
Effective habit change, no matter the target audience, requires more than 
an understanding of Systems 1 and 2 and of cue, behavior and reward. Kahne-
man (2011) notes that, “System 1 continuously generates suggestions for System 
2: impressions, intuitions, intentions, and feelings. If endorsed by System 2, 
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impressions and intuitions turn into beliefs, and impulses turn into voluntary 
actions.” Heath and Heath (2010) use this characterization to identify three 
requirements for effective habit change: applying System 2’s careful analysis, 
endorsing System 1’s instincts, and shaping the path toward habit change.
8  Applying System 2’s Analysis
To apply System 2, the organization or the system must provide clear instructions 
about what to do and what goals will be achieved. If people fail to change habits, 
it is usually because of:
 – Ambiguity: They cannot figure out what they should be doing.
 – Vagueness: The targets are vague.
 – Overload: They are trying to change too much at the same time.
Kirlappos and Sasse (2012) diagnosed all three mistakes in the security aware-
ness and education campaigns they examined. Security awareness needs to have 
concrete goals for each habit, be designed as an ongoing effort, and tackle one 
change at the time. For example, security awareness might start with an easily-
achievable goal that encourages employees to feel successful about their security 
behavior:
 – Goal: Zero unencrypted USB devices by the beginning of next month
 – Monitor Change Over Time: Evaluate USB devices each month, give feedback 
to show adopters their progress, and tell laggards what is needed for making 
progress
 – Target: One device type
In addition, habit change activities should acknowledge that people tend to make 
changes to habits that are easier to modify but may not have as much impact. 
(Kempton et al. 1985; Diekmann and Preisendörfer 1992). Indeed, once a “token 
modification” is made, users feel as if they have contributed to the security effort 
and need not do more.
9  Endorsing System 1’s Instincts
To motivate individuals to change, security awareness must address their emotive 
side, evoking a visceral response that confronts individuals with the extent of the 
problem or the benefits. To see why, consider how people who develop bad habits 
Brought to you by | UCL - University College London
Authenticated
Download Date | 2/5/15 4:44 PM
504      Shari Lawrence Pfleeger et al.
can be motivated to change them. For example, over-eaters, presented with a cata-
logue of food they habitually eat in a month or the life expectancy associated with 
their weight, often change their habits. Security motivation can similarly jolt indi-
viduals out of comfortable beliefs. Symantec’s Race to Stay Safe tests your ability 
to distinguish a bona fide from a corrupt website: https://www.staysecureonline.
com/staying-safe-online. It shows ten examples of two near-identical websites; the 
corrupt one has at least one characteristic that should make you suspicious. When 
people choose the wrong one, they are more receptive to being told about features 
they should check before using a website. Habit change might also be motivated 
by showing interviews with victims of identity theft, or displaying bundles of $50 
notes to visualize the cost of cleaning infected machines.
10  Shaping the Path to Habit Change
Since changing habits is difficult, it is important to remove obstacles on the path 
to establishing the new habit. Obstacles can distract individuals from the goals, 
or provide excuses to slip back into the old habits. When security is unusable and 
cumbersome, reversion to the old, more efficient shortcut is pre-programmed. 
More importantly, organizations can be proactive, designing practices and tools 
to assist people in changing their habits.
Hodgson (2004) noted that “Routines are the organizational analogues of 
habits.” Heath and Heath (2010) argue that their three principles apply to organi-
zational change: “if you reach the riders in your team but not the elephants, team 
members will have understanding without motivation. If you reach the elephants 
but not the riders, they’ll have passion without direction.”
Organizations can appeal to employees’ rational side to follow security rules, 
but when workers face many demands, they find it hard to motivate themselves; 
change is difficult because people wear themselves out. If organizations try to 
force changing without motivating and smoothing the path, both they and their 
employees will run out of resources without accomplishing the goal. Thus, to 
make extensive changes, an organization must focus on keystone habits: habits 
that “start a process that, over time, transforms everything.” Keystone habits 
work because “habits have the power to start a chain reaction, changing other 
habits as they move through the organization.” (Duhigg 2012).
There are many examples of successful habit change using this principle. For 
instance, O’Neill turned around Alcoa, an ailing company, by making safety a 
keystone habit (Cable 2013). When he became CEO, O’Neill stunned colleagues 
and investors by making safety his top priority. He picked safety because it was 
a goal the affected the whole company, and with which no one could disagree. 
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He set a concrete goal: zero accidents. By changing how the company handled 
safety, he created “a habit of excellence … an indicator that we are making pro-
gressing changing our habits across the entire institution.”(Duhigg 2012). Safety 
provided the focus for discussion and collaboration throughout the organization 
to achieve the one goal, which in turn started to shift, dislodge and remake other 
patterns. Keystone habits work because “success does not depend on getting 
every single thing right, but instead identifying a few priorities and fashioning 
them into powerful levers.”
What keystone habits can be used to instill a security culture? “Good leaders 
seize crises to remake organizational habits” and routines (Duhigg 2012). So secu-
rity breaches can draw attention to policies and practices that can spawn trans-
formation; employees may pay attention to changes during a crisis that might 
meet resistance in more comfortable times.
11   Using Moral Foundations to Motivate Security 
Awareness and Action
Researchers such as Bandura (2007) and Blankenship and Wegener (2008) 
have used values as a context for habit change, especially in addressing climate 
change. In the same way, we can build a multi-dimensional framework for under-
standing how individuals and groups perceive security that can drive new ways 
to build and use systems. Our framework uses the six dimensions of Haidt 2012’s 
research on moral foundation, examining them from the perspective of habit for-
mation. For each dimension, we look for a keystone habit that reflects that dimen-
sion and can be used to apply System 2’s analysis, endorse System 1’s instincts, 
and shape the path.
Heath and Heath (2010) explain how to accomplish these steps. To effectively 
influence System 2, we appeal to a person’s rational side using three strategies:
 – Find the bright spots: Look for strategies that are already working and repeat 
them in ways that encourage employees to meet the organization’s goal.
 – Script the critical moves: Break the practices into bite-sized pieces, so that 
people understand exactly how to get from here to there.
 – Point to the destination. Show people what the goal looks like and give them 
signals about how much progress they are making.
To trigger System 1’s instincts, we appeal to a person’s emotional side:
 – Identify the instinct or feeling: Make the results visceral, connecting the 
desired outcome to something that the employees know and understand.
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 – Shrink the change: When the full set of changes is daunting, break the change 
into pieces that are easy to accomplish.
 – Grow the people: Cultivate a mindset that marries the people to their goal and 
gives them an identity to which they aspire.
Finally, to shape the path, we can alter the environment, build habits and rally 
the team. Sometimes, the environment itself acts as a barrier to change. By chang-
ing the environment (e.g. by using a safer search engine), we make it easier for 
employees to develop the desirable habits. When there are aspects of the desir-
able habits that can be organized so that they do not deplete the compliance 
budget, we can invoke those changes: use checklists, reminders and warnings, 
for example. And when the desired habits have been instilled in some employees, 
we rally the team by advertising those successes to the other employees.
Table 3 displays the combination of moral foundations theory with habit 
formation.
12   Conclusions, Open Research Questions and 
Next Steps
In previous sections, we presented a framework based on empirical validation 
of both moral foundations theory and habit formation that can be used to set us 
on the path toward a more robust security culture. We have also shown linkages 
between problems solved this way in other domains with problems we experience 
in security; the linkages suggest likely success in developing a security culture. 
In this section, we examine in more depth the short- and long-term activities in 
which we can engage.
As noted earlier, the most desirable situation is making security behavior 
seamless: browsers that automatically screen out suspect web sites, tools that 
control access to valuable data, and more. There is no way to make all choices for 
a user, so the choices must be infrequent and require only minimal distraction 
from primary tasks. Thus, in the short term, we can focus on several key activities, 
each with an accompanying research question:
 – Design systems so that security decisions are spread out, not clustered together 
to deplete a user’s compliance budget. Research question: By how much does 
each security action deplete a user’s energy?
 – Design systems to provide reminders of good security choices. Research ques-
tion: How often is too often? How infrequently renders the reminder system 
ineffective?
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 – Assess each individual’s place in the six-dimensional value space, and tailor 
training and messages to the result. Research question: Survey instruments 
exist to assess each dimension. How can they be tailored to focus on security 
aspects of each dimension?
In the long-term, more difficult questions should be addressed.
 – How do we separate personal from professional security behavior and 
culture?
 – How does each behavior relate to the value dimensions? That is, rewards, 
warnings, and trust relationships can be mapped to the six dimensions. 
Then, habit formation can be based on the six-tuple, so that all aspects of a 
behavior are considered.
 – Can underlying values be changed from negative to positive? That is, are 
there people whose values suggest that appropriate security behavioral 
change would be difficult or even impossible? In such cases, is it possible to 
change the environment to suit the values, or must a user be prevented from 
performing certain jobs?
 – Is there a risk that changed behavior will revert to old, undesirable habits 
over time? Inoculation theory (McGuire 1961) examines how attitudes and 
beliefs remain consistent despite attempts to persuade change. This area of 
inquiry may have useful application to cyber security.
The answers to these open research questions, provided by continuing hypothesis 
formulation and empirical investigation, will enable us to create and nourish a 
security culture. We have stressed the importance of a multi-disciplinary human 
factors focus, with empirical investigations that seek to understand how and why 
habits form and how they can be changed by a variety of interventions. The days 
of prescriptive technological solutions to security issues are surely over, given the 
data that suggest not only that they do not work but also that they frequently lead to 
the “law of unintended consequences” whereby they exacerbate security problems.
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